SeaViking 04
"Sumatra Caliphate"
October AWE Scenario Outline

Unclassified

For Official Use Only

Version 2

4 May 2004

Disclaimer

The situation described in this scenario is hypothetical and is intended to provoke thought and discussion. It does not represent the views of the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Commandant of the Marine Corps or any other government agency.

Background

- The SV04 scenario is based on the Olympic Dragon 2004 scenario and incorporates major elements of the Joint Forces Command's Sumesia and Joint Urban Warfare scenarios.
- It is a different scenario from the Sumesia and JUW scenarios, the blue and red forces are completely different, the purpose of this scenario is completely different. It CAN NOT be assumed that things that exist in the other scenarios apply to the SV04 Scenario.
- **Changes from previous versions are highlighted in BLUE**
- **Important Changes or Comments are in red**

Changes from Last Version

- Minor timeline modification slides 22, 24 as a result of Force Flow Conference 15-16 April
- Corrected a discrepancy in locations of ASCM Battery 3 and defending units between slides 36,38,44,53 & 59
- Improved slides on new Sumatra Oil Field discovery replaced slides 9, 149, and 150, added new slide 151

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SV04 Scenario Summary

This scenario involves Joint Operations against a rogue commander with significant regional anti-access capability and with limited access to non-nuclear WMD.

China is a major player behind the scenes, taking advantage of regional instability for strategic gains while maintaining plausible deniability.

In late 2015, a multi-national maritime group, TF Swashbuckler, is fighting a major piracy threat in the strait between Malaysia and Sumatra. US and UK casualties results in US and UK Naval TF's being sent to the Straits.

It was discovered that Governor General Ibn Ander, of central Sumatra is the mastermind behind the Pirates and has major ties to terrorist groups. The piracy was financing Ibn Ander's plan to declare independence in 2017.

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) declares Ibn Ander a traitor. Ibn Ander declares independence two years early and establishes the Red Caliphate. Ibn Ander is popular and controls significant military, political and economic power. Ibn Ander uses his terrorist links to directly threaten the GOI.

His actions threatens the survival of the GOI and regional stability; however, his premature moves leaves him vulnerable to swift counter attack. The GOI requests and gets US and International military support.

TF Swashbuckler is subsumed by CTF Blue.

CTF Blue is tasked to conduct operations to open access to the Caliphate for GOI and Allied Forces, stop Ibn Ander's bid for independence, and neutralize the Pirates.

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AWE Assumptions

- **To meet SV04 Objectives, play will <u>mostly</u> remain at the CTF level and below. The main military effort will be focused on the JOA and the Caliphate.**
- **Limited Host Nation Support, no unrestricted ports or airfields in JOA. Jakarta available as limited transhipment point.**
- **Very restricted basing in theater**
- **Timeframe: October 2015 (+)**
- **Region: SE Asia**
- **Classification: Unclassified**
- **Enemy has limited capacity to make Chem./Bio agents and to Employ/Deploy Chem./Bio via TBM, Artillery, UAV and small civilian acft (crop dusters).**

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Scenario Application

- This scenario will be used in two major SV04 events:
  - The May Seminar
  - The October AWE
- The May Seminar is a seminar style wargame that will examine three CONOPS 2015+, SJTF-FE, and 2015.
  - For all 3 ideas the scenario will remain constant except for the Blue OOB’s and Blue Plans.
  - 3 special situation sections have been added to this brief segregate the differences.
- The October AWE is a simulation supported CPX that will examine recommendations from the Seminar.

Road to War (2004 – 2015+)

- Indonesian government remains a struggling democracy hampered by weak institutions, debt issues, and corruption
- Since the 90s, Indonesian society increasingly influenced by conservative Islam
- Indonesian military aligned into religious and secular groups engaged in an internal power struggle
- Indonesian economy never fully recovered from the financial crisis of late 90s
- Indonesian society remains sharply divided between "haves" and "have-nots"
- New oil find provides funding stream for military hardware
- China and Insurgents see this weakness as an

06-New oil field discovered in Central Sumatra

- Estimated 2.4 Million barrel per day of new production doubles Indonesia's oil out places it in top 10 oil producing nations





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Road to War

China-Iran-Indonesia Connection

- China has long history of selling military technology and hardware to Iran
- As part of their “Chokepoint Strategy”, China actively pursues economic and military ties with Iran’s Regressive government
- Iran’s Regressive government sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah creates link to Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI) terrorist group?
- Through MMI, China also becomes indirectly linked to Islamist faction of the Indonesian military
- China seeks to develop a relationship with any element in Indonesia that will facilitate control of the government

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Road to War China-Iran-Indonesia Connection



- After 2006 oil discovery in Indonesia, China approaches Indonesia with offer of military hardware and training in exchange for guaranteed access to oil and gas
- 2008 – Indonesia agrees to long-term gas and oil shipment contracts with China in return for military hardware and training
- China now has established relationships with both the Government of Indonesia and the MMI / Islamist military faction

Nur Muis Ibn Ander
Background

- Sumatra native, devout Muslim
- A leader in a powerful Sumatran family once lead by Pirate Kings
- Idolizes Mohammed Hatta and 1958 rebellion of Sumatran military officers against Jakarta government
- Harbors idealistic dreams of a “strictly Islamic and independent (from Java) Caliphate of Sumatra”
- Distant relative of Wei Suoni, leader of a “branch” of the Sujava Pirates operating in the Malacca Strait
- Intense (but carefully hidden) dislike and distrust of the Javanese elite and their ethnic Chinese business associates
- Fast burner, served in both Special Forces and Strategic Reserve

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“Road to War”

- 2004 – MG Ibn Ander runs into “Javanese ceiling” as MG, career stagnates. Ibn Ander Bitterly resents failure to advance in Army, becomes hard-core member of Islamist faction of military
- 2005 - In lieu of promotion, Ibn Ander retired and appointed Military Governor of two important provinces: Sumatra Barat and Riau.

- His capitol is Pekanbaru. The region is a vital industrialized and oil producing region of Indonesia’s largest island, Sumatra. Riau includes the islands in the Strait.
- Ibn Ander is a successful and competent leader, he brings stability and prosperity to the region. This stability prompts the GOI to reassign many of their national and strategic units and weapons systems to Ibn Ander’s military district where they are better protected. The prosperity allows Ibn Ander to pursued the GOI to buy advanced weapons systems.

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Road to War (cont)

- Ibn Ander and his family have an inherent (but carefully hidden) dislike and distrust of the Javanese elite and their ethnic Chinese business associates. The entire family unites in full support of "Sumatra for Sumatrans" If Ibn Ander is killed other senior family members will take his place.

- 2006 - Huge new oil / gas discovery in Central Sumatra near Pekanbaru
  - New find spans Ibn Ander's two provinces
  - Already a vital industrialized and oil producing part of Indonesia, the region is now the economic heart of the country
- 2007— Ibn Ander starts a 10 year plan for independence. Publicly he is a loyal competent Governor, privately he bribes, subverts or intimidates to gain control of all elements of power before declaring independence.

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Road to War (cont)

- He allies with Free Aceh Movement providing clandestine safe-haven in his area. He demands "rent" from them in return for his protection.
- This highly profitable arrangement is expanded to include Jemaah Islamiah and Lasker Jihad when they are forced underground by the GOI. Through Jemaah Islamiah and Lasker Jihad, Ibn Ander establishes a relationship with Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI) and through MMI clandestine contacts with Iran and China.
- Through MMI Ibn Ander starts sleeper cells in Jakarta to disrupt and distract the GOI when he declares independence in 2017.
- Ibn Ander is a nominally devout but pragmatic Muslim, who is not afraid to play the "ethnic Chinese card" by inciting violence against them.
- 2008— Ibn Ander realizes the "plan" will cost more than he can obtain through normal graft and corruption. Through his Pirate Chieftain relative Wei Souni, Ibn Ander cuts a deal with the Sulawesi Pirates. They

Road to War (cont)

- 2009 - Existing oil extraction infrastructure allows for accelerated exploitation of new gas and oil field
- 2010 - Indonesian government purchases floating 40 Megawatt nuclear powered electric generation station from Russia and places it in **Tanjung Priok port** north of Jakarta
- 2010 - Ibn Ander establishes a “shipping insurance” extortion scheme through crime syndicate (Tommy Wong)
- 2010 - Ibn Ander aggressively pursues control of all elements of power in his two provinces via Islamic solidarity, political and military connections, bribery, and intimidation
  - He coopts leadership of the Free Aceh Movement, local Jemaah Islamiah and Laskar Jihad cells, providing safe-haven in return for rent and cooperation in his restive provinces
- 2010 - Ibn Ander’s administration of the two provinces is highly successful, and the new oil field generates tremendous revenue for the central and provincial governments
  - Economic benefit focused on political elite in Jakarta and populace of Riau and Pekabaru

“Road to War” (cont)

- 2011 - Ibn Ander lobbies government to buy military hardware from China and station it in Central Sumatra to defend “Indonesia’s economic heartland”
- Equipment the government does not buy, he acquires via international black market with Chinese assistance
- Military hardware and increased capability coupled with a cut of profits creates strong loyalty to Ibn Ander from the military stationed in Sumatra
- 2011 - MMI and international terrorist allies use **slums as base of operations** for local, regional and global terrorism
  - International **demands to close down MMI safe havens disregarded** by Indonesian government unable / unwilling to act
- 2012 – Ibn Ander controls political, military, economic and social (criminal) environment of Sumatra

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“Road to War” (cont)

- 2012 - **Drought** begins that devastates rice crop, resulting in **mass migration to Jakarta**
- 2013 - **Drought ends** with torrential rains, **massive flooding**, creating high level of suffering in the city
- 2013 - **College students** organize largely non-violent **demonstrations** against government corruption and ineptitude
- 2014 - Ibn Ander monitors the growing humanitarian crisis and civil unrest in Jakarta and sees an opportunity (Urban Scenario and RONA)
- 2014 - He approaches Islamist faction of military with a proposal to join forces in overthrowing the government and create an Islamic State
- 2014 - Ibn Ander secretly becomes leader of the Islamist military / MMI / Ibn Ander alliance (the Caliphate)

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“Road to War” (cont)

- The Plan: Ibn Ander will speed up his schedule, declare the Caliphate and “secede” from Indonesia when the move to overthrow the government takes place in Jakarta
  - He supports and equips sleeper cells in Jakarta to disrupt and distract the government of Indonesia when the Islamist military / MMI alliance moves to overthrow it (Urban Scenario and RONA)
  - Ibn Ander’s forces will threaten to disrupt oil and gas production in Pekan Baru and / or disrupt shipping in the Strait of Malacca should “outside forces” move to intervene on Indonesian soil
- 2014 - MMI activates **secret alliance with select Islamic military officers**
- Late 2014 - MMI followers **infiltrate** student demonstrations, incite violence, **target ethnic Chinese** and **advocate overthrow of government**
- MMI aligned **military forces selectively “respond**” to riot areas, violence continues, **ethnic Chinese suffer heavily,** begin to **flee country**
- 2014 — Pirate attacks effect world economies, and hits Asia very hard. UN authorizes multinational naval TF. (TF Swashbuckler).

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Road to War (cont)

- China finds it politically impossible to oppose this UN action and provides token participation.
- TF Swashbuckler (TFS) consists mostly of coast guard type vessels with a few small navy ships. TFS Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) provide surveillance and air to surface anti-ship missiles.
- January 2015 – Ibn Ander needing more and more cash as his plan nears fruition, steps up the Pirate activity. He provides the pirates with heavier weapons purchased on the black market. The encounters between the pirates and TFS become deadly, several TFS patrol vessels are sunk or badly damaged.
- Both a UK Frigate and a USCG Cutter take heavy losses when trying to capture pirate boats. US / UK Public Opinion demands a response. By July 2015, a US CSG and ESG and a UK ESG (Det 3d CDO BDE) set sail to reinforce TFS.

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Road to War (cont)

- Aug-Sept 2015 – Humanitarian crisis in Jakarta peaks.
- World attention is focused on Indonesia
- Behind the scenes, China diplomatically characterized the rebellion as an “internal affair” in the UN Security Council.
  - Advocates only a humanitarian intervention in Jakarta to reduce human suffering.
- UN approves “robust” humanitarian intervention.
- Humanitarian relief forces began to move towards Jakarta.
- The increased international scrutiny, the domestic unrest and the growing numbers of military forces in the region prompts China to urge Ibn Ander and MMI to delay the COUP attempt. China threatens to withdraw all support and not recognize their government if they move before China is ready.
- Ibn Ander and MMI hesitate and put a hold on their coup plans but continue to foment unrest in Jakarta. A dispute grows between Ibn Ander and MMI over their next step.
- August 2015 — Investigations into Tommy Wong’s syndicate shows links between pirates, Ibn Ander and terrorists, prompting an investigation.

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Road to War (cont)

- Sept 2015 Remainder of 3rd CDO embarked in a UK RNTG (Royal Navy TF) arrives Brunei for exercises; Simulated Offload vic Sibolga
- 13 Sept PACOM I&W indicates major unrest immanent.
- 18 Sept PACOM establishes the CTF: Refined Planning/Shaping initiated
- 23 Sept USPACOM CTF In coordination with USPACOM and POTUS, deploys selected forces/capabilities for deterrence/shaping
- 25 Sept PACOM receives Ambiguous Warning that Ibn Ander is planning to stage a COUP, serious concerns are raised about his incipient WMD capabilities and emerging links to international terrorists
- 26 Sept 2015 An International UN Commission in Pekanbaru discovers Ibn Ander's plan. Commission attacked and killed after sending report.
- 29 Sept GOI sends commando unit to arrest Ibn Ander for treason.
- Palace guard engages commando's in firefight and Ibn Ander escapes.
- 1 Oct Ibn Ander facing treason charges, suddenly declares Independence and announces formation of Caliphate as "True Islamic State" that will defend its sovereignty with the "Fist of Islam"
- MMI is caught off guard and the Chinese Leaders dither.
- GOI and Caliphate forces mal-deployed, neither able to strike decisive blow.
- Morocco and Yemen open diplomatic relations with the Caliphate.
- Ibn Ander's power and influence threatens the survival of GOI
- Ibn Ander's links to international terrorists and potential to make WMD draws in direct US and Coalition Involvement.

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“Road to War” (cont)

- 2015 - Morocco and Yemen conduct military exercises near SLOCs as “show of support and Islamic solidarity”
- 2015 - Iran demands an “internal solution” to an “internal affair” and declares outside interference “a violation of national sovereignty and a war on Islam”
- 2015 - Iran, Morocco, Yemen statements and actions create a high level of concern in Asia for flow of commerce and oil
- 2015 - International price of oil fluctuates wildly
- 2015 - Muslim “street” is highly supportive of the Caliphate
- 2015 - Most Islamic governments are supportive “in principle” of the Caliphate, but also “very concerned” about the impact of instability on flow of international commerce
- 2015 - Japan and Korea “gravely concerned” about potential disruption to flow of commercial shipping and oil

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Road to War (cont)

- TF Swashbuckler not configured for major land combat. US, UK and Aus immediately send reinforcements and call for an expanded mandate.
- 2 Oct GOI requests US, UK, AUS and UN assistance. UN changes mandate and provides support to a US led Combined TF (CTF) to subsume TF Swashbuckler, China does not openly block the move, but continues to oppose the CTF behind the scenes.
- 3 Oct (C-DAY) The CTF tasked to: Stop Ibn Ander's bid for independence; Restore GOI Sovereignty by enabling GOI forces to enter the Caliphate; Defeat the Pirates. Hostilities Commence
- Singapore is not available due to the proximity of red forces in the Riau's.
- Jakarta is a limited transshipment point, hampered by the unrest and humanitarian effort.
- Anti-Piracy efforts continue in the Strait but Major Offensive Operations are restricted in the Straits to avoid disrupting Shipping and impacting the world economy.
- Red Navy units are hiding in the clutter or islands in the Strait to conduct attacks and is threatening to mine the strait.
- CTF is directed to minimize the presence of foreign military forces on the ground in Indonesia outside of the Caliphate to avoid inciting the civilian population and inviting attack by Islamic Radicals.
- The Humanitarian Intervention in Jakarta is independent of the CTF efforts against Ibn Ander

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General Situation



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Red Situation

Ibn Ander's C2 Organization



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Bad Actor Relationships

Broken Line = Cooperation

Solid Line = Control



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Red Objective

If Conflict does not expand

- Objective: Gain independence
- Methodology:
  - DO NOT initiate Offensive Ops except against GOI
  - Declare independence from corrupt Jakarta government in order to establish self-rule, free from the Javanese elite
  - Offer to hold elections in 2 years in order to gain world support and UN acceptance
  - Promise to act decisively to end piracy within territorial waters in order to stabilize the world's economic fears and gain world support for a negotiated settlement
  - Invite NGOs into area in order to gain world support and complicate coalition targeting
  - Survive until Central Government collapses "Fait Accompli" in order to provide a functioning, acceptable alternative
  - Repeatedly stress "Caliphate" does not desire hostilities in order to preserve infrastructure and avoid conflict
    - Avoid direct conflict with Coalition forces

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Red Objective

If US and Allies attack

- Objective: Gain independence
- Methodology:
  - Portray country as small Muslim nation attacked unjustly by rich Christian crusaders in order to gain word-wide Muslim sympathy and sway world opinion
  - Invite international media – to showcase coalition atrocities in order to gain world support and sympathy
  - Inflict as many casualties as possible with air/naval attacks, delay with mines and obstacles in order to sway U.S. opinion, energize the anti-war activists and provide the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections with a war issue
  - Attempt to draw coalition forces into a MOUT/Jungle fight in order to prolong the war and gain world support to stop the hostilities
  - Ask for UN brokered cease fire in order to derail the coalition’s timeline and gain world support to end hostilities

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Red Initial Actions

- 1 October 2015: Red declares independence from Green
- 1 Oct: GOI mobilizes forces to put down rebellion and requests assistance
- 2 Oct POTUS directs PACOM to prepare for operations in support of GOI against Red and to immediately reinforce TFS. Coalition negotiations for new mission for TFS commence
- 2 Oct: Red conducts air strikes IOT destroy loyalist Air forces. Terrorists attack GOI military on Java IOT delay deployment. Red ground, coastal, & naval forces deploy
- 3 Oct: Red destroys the bridges on the northern and southern roads IOT deny their use as a re-supply route and slow advance of Green forces
- 4 Oct: Red makes token arrests of terrorists IOT garner international support.
- 5 Oct: Red invites media to tour dual-use research and industrial facilities in the capital that can manufacture chemical or biological agents. Ibn Ander says that he has no WMD but could manufacture agents quickly if the survival of the Caliphate is at stake.
- UN approves reorganization of TFS and endorses mission of CTF

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Caliphate's Evaluation of its Centers of Gravity

- Strategic:
  - **Diplomatic:** International recognition legitimizes the Caliphate.
  - **Information:** Popular support for an independent Caliphate based upon peoples' belief that Ibn Ander's leadership brings regional stability & prosperity.
  - **Military:**
    - Ports of Padang and Dumai – capture by US/coalition provides secure entry point into the Caliphate for GOI forces.
    - Missile Forces – neutralization of TBMs prevents attack on GOI & countries supporting the coalition in the region.
  - **Economic:** Caliphate's economy based on revenue from oil.

- Operational:
  - Airfields at Pekanbaru and Padang – closure by Blue attack neutralizes the Caliphate's air force.
  - The Caliphate's command and control system - Interruption of Caliphate's C2 system prevents the Caliphate leadership from coordinating the actions of its dispersed military forces and ability to influence the civilian population.
  - Ability to produce, deploy & employ WME which will influence regional countries considering support for US/coalition forces.

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Caliphate's Evaluation of Its Critical Vulnerabilities

- Strategic:
  - **Diplomatic:** Preventing international recognition isolates the Caliphate from outside support.
  - **Information:** Exposing Ibn Ander's ties to terrorists/pirates results in international embargo, which inflicts hardship on the people, thus adversely impacting popular support for his leadership.
  - **Military:** Inability to regenerate combat losses makes a quick Caliphate victory paramount.
  - **Economic:** An embargo & suppression of pirate activity removes a principal source of revenue.

- Operational: Dispersed forces limited in their ability to mutually support each other.

- Tactical: Replenishing stocks of ammunition & repair parts would be difficult under an international embargo.

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Caliphate Maritime Forces



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aliphate Maritime Defense



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Caliphate Maritime Lay-down (Padang)


Tanjungpinang Naval Base
1 Scorpion PGM
2 Lurssen PB
I Parchim I PG
1 Houxin PTG
2 Tacoma LST with 1 NAS 332 & 3 Remote Controlled Jetski drones each
Sta 1 - 1 Lurssen PB & 1 Tacoma LST
1 Kilo 877 EKM SS
2 Tacoma LST
1 Lurssen PB
1 Scorpion PGM
4 C-14 PGM
2 Tacoma LST with 1 NAS 332 & 4 Remote Controlled Jetski dro
1 Parchim I PG
2 Gladiator Remote Controlled Drones
Sta 2 - 1 Houxin PTG
Sta 3 - 1 Scorpion PGM
Sta 4 - 1 Houxin PTG
1 Houxin PTG
4 C-14 PGM
1 Kakap PGM
2 Gladiator Remote Controlled drones
Sta 7: 1 Valour FFG
Hydrophone array (land based)
Sta 5 - 1 Scorpion PGM
Sta Echo- Kilo 877 EKM SS
Sta Charlie - Amur SS
Sta 6 - 1 Kapap PGM
Sta Delta - Kilo 877 EKM SS
Sta Alfa - Kilo 636 S
Sta 8 - 1 Lurssen PB
0
120 NM
240 NM
Sta Bravo - Amur SS
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Caliphate Maritime

Padang Harbor Protection System (H

Ref: http://www.safebarrier.com

Combination of strong physical barrier and sophisticated alarm and surveillance techniqu

Guard against hostile intrusions.

HarPS is capable of physically preventing, and

Making any attempts of intrusions by divers, s

Boats, or underwater crafts considerably diffic

All sensors and the command system are COT

Equipment.

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Caliphate Maritime Lay-down (Dumai)



SV04 Maritime Minefields

The locations of the minefields are those listed in warnings published by the Caliphate IAW International Law

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RED Mines



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Minefield Data
SW Coast Caliphate

Name	Lat	Long	Depth	Length X Width	Density
Pulau Pini East	**00-15N** **00-08N**	**099-08E** **098-52E**	**<25 Ftm**	**17x5nm**	**Spaced 500 yards apart** **In two rows**
Pulau Pini South West	**00-03N** **00-06S**	**098-37E** **098-31E**	**<25Ftm**	**6x1nm** **Fills gaps between reefs**	
Selat Siberut 1st Leg	**00-34S** **00-34S**	**098-31E** **098-38E**	**3nm >100ftm** **2nm 100-25ftm** **2nm <25ftn**	**7x5nm**	
Selat Siberut 2nd Leg	**00-34S** **00-55S**	**098-38E** **098-50E**	**<25ftm**	**24x5nm**	
Selat Bungalaut	**01-56S** **01-58S**	**099-20E** **099-32E**	**10nm 50-25ftm** **2.5nm <25ftm**	**12.5x5nm**	
Selat Sipura	**Not mined, covered by observation, patrols and ASCM's**				
All flanks anchored in shoal water					

Minefield Data
NE Coast Caliphate

Name	Lat	Long	Width of Lane	Density
Bagansiapiapi	**02-05N**	**100-48E**	**2nm**	**Spaced 500 yards apart In two rows**
Dumai (North)	**02-00N**	**101-22E**	**3nm**	
Bengkalis (includes Dumai and waterways to Pekanbaru)	**01-35N**	**101-55E**	**4nm**	
Sungai Kampar River	**00-33N**	**103-20E**	**2nm**	
Selat Riau North Tanjungpinang Naval Base	**01-06N**	**104-12E**	**2nm**	
Selat Riau South Tanjungpinang Naval Base	**00-45N**	**104-25E**	**4nm**	

Lat/Longs mark center of fields blocking shipping lanes approaching the harbors or rivers

All fields are in water less than 60 meters

Refs: ONC L-10, Nautical Charts 71261, 71265

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Caliphate Air Defense Forces Lay-Down



Current Red Air Force Laydown



Padang Naval Air Station (00 56S / 100 19E)
8 CN-235 MPA A/C
6 x Sqd SU-25 Frogfoots (72 AC)
Base Security Platoon (60 troops)

Pekanbaru (00 28 20N/101 27 10E)
6 x Sqd SU-30 MKI Flankers (72 AC)
2 B-727 AEW
3 KC-130 Refuelers
2 x Attack UAV Squadrons (36 AC)
4 x Mini (ISRT) UAV Flights (64 AC)
4 x Mi-8
ADA Battalion HQ (MANPADS)
2 x AD Bn
Base Security Company (120 troops)

TBM Brigade

Loc:
1st Bn vic 1st Inf Bde in the North vic
Ujungbatu 00 42’N 100 30’ E

2nd Bn vic 2nd Inf Bde vic
Rengat/Juapura 00 21’S 102 20’ E



3 x AMX VCI
6 x Support Truck
1 x TPS-75
650 personnel

8 x Tractor Trailer
20 x Large Truck
6 x Fuel Trucks
6 x Cargo Trucks

Two Platoons, each having
2 x Scud-C
1x BODYGUARD FTG
3 x SA-18 MANPAD
3 x Support Truck

1 x CMD vehicle
2 x Support Trucks

Three Platoons, each having
4 x CSS-7
1x BODYGUARD FTG
3 x SA-18 MANPAD
3 x Support Truck

1 x CMD vehicle
2 x Support Trucks

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Caliphate TBM Forces Lay-Down

Pirate Groups

Sujava Pirates – Sumatra and Java
- Chiefs
- Wei Suoni (Malacca Strait)
- Huang Daming (Lombok Strait)
- Jir Hongwei (Sunda Strait)
- Ayu Nani Quinn (Sumba Strait)
- Loose Confederation to avoid turf wars
- Will follow Ibn Anders guidance as long as it is profitable
- MO: Mix of low observable speedboats and enhanced Dhows

Yodaya Pirates (colloquial Burmese term for Thai Pirates)
- Chief: Ruengwet Saengoi (there maybe more unidentified chiefs)
- MO: Take only high pay-off goods, abandon ship
- Low observable, high performance speedboats
- Kill the Crew
- AOR: Malacca Strait & sea routes into Singapore
- Practical and ruthless

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

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Caliphate Ground Forces

Organizational Diagrams

Caliphate Ground Forces Organization



Caliphate Ground Forces Organization for Combat



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Caliphate Ground Forces Lay-Down

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1st Mech Infantry Brigade Laydown



1st Infantry Brigade Laydown




2nd Infantry Brigade
Laydown
2nd Inf Bde (-)
1st Inf Bn
2nd Inf Bn
Mortar Bn (-)
AT Co (-)
2nd FA Bn (-)
6th MRL Bn (-)
UAV Atk Co
UAV Recon Co
SA-19 Co
3rd Inf Bn
FA Btry
Mortar Co
AT Plt
6 – MRL (300 mm)
3 – SA-18
MANPAD
0°18'S
0°36'S
0°54'S
102°E
102°18'E
102°36'E
UNCLASSIFIED//LIMDIS

3rd Infantry Brigade Laydown



3rd Inf Bde (-)
- 1st Inf Bn
- Mortar Bn (-)
- AT Co (-)
- 3rd FA Bn (-)
- 7th MRL Bn (-)
- UAV Atk Co
- UAV Recon Co
- SA-19 Co

2nd Inf Bn
- Mortar Co
- AT Plt

3rd Inf Bn
- FA Btry
- Mortar Co
- AT Plt
- 6 – MRL (300 mm)
- 3 – SA-18 MANPAD

Current Caliphate Ground Disposition/Actions

- Defend Northern border with 1st Infantry Brigade (one FA Bn & one MLR Bn in DS) IOT deny loyalist/coalition forces access to the Caliphate.
- Defend Southern border with 2nd Infantry Brigade (one FA Bn & one MLR Bn in DS) IOT deny loyalist/coalition forces access to the Caliphate.
- Defend Dumai port & airfield with 3rd Infantry Brigade (one FA Bn & one MLR Bn in DS) IOT deny their use by loyalist/coalition forces.
- Defend the Padang Coastal Region with 1st Mech Infantry Brigade (one MLR Bn in DS) against loyalist/coalition surface assault.
- Defend Padang port/airfield, 3 coastal ASCM sites, & Riau Islands naval base & ASCM site with five Naval Inf Bn TFs IOT deny loyalist/coalition forces access.
- Defend the Capital & secure the Caliph & his staff with the Palace Guard Bn (Mech). The MP Battalion & ADA Brigade defend the capital.
- Defend the Pekanbaru Airport with 1st Armor Battalion (Sep) & Pekanbaru Militia Battalion (one FA Bn in GS).
- Conduct terrorist attacks with Koppassus lead terrorist cells vic Jakarta to disrupt coalition ISB operations and the GOI.

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Caliphate Ground Forces Lay-down and Missions

Unit	Location	Mission
Palace Guard	Pekanbaru Govt Complex	Defend the Leadership
1st Mech Bde Hqs	SW Coast vic Padang	C2 defense of SW coast & Tabing Airport
1st Mech Bn, 1st Bde	Tabing Airport	Defend airport
2nd Mech Bn, 1st Bde	vic Pandjang 0deg 28min S 100deg 24min E	Defend southwest coast in sector
3rd Mech Bn, 1st Bde	vic 1deg 10min S 100deg 28min E	Defend southwest coast in sector
4th Armor Bn, 1st Bde	Tabing Airport	Reserve
1st Armor Bn (Sep)	Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru	Defend AP, support other units in city if attacked
Peakanbaru Militia Bn	Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru	Defend AP, support other units in city if attacked
1st Artillery Bde	vic Pekanbaru	C2 fire support to maneuver units
1st FA & 5th MRL Bn's	vic Ujungbatu w/1st Inf Bde	DS to 1st Inf Bde
2nd FA & 6th MRL Bn's	vic Renat/Juapara w/2nd Inf Bde	DS to 2nd Inf Bde
3rd FA & 7th MRL Bn's	vic Dumai w/3rd Inf Bde	DS to 3rd Inf Bde
4th FA Bn	Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru	GS to units vic Pekanbaru
8th MRL Bn	vic Padang w/1st Mech Bde	DS to 1st Mech Bde
UAV Bn	Dispersed to Bdes	Attack enemy C2 nodes & recon
Aviation Squadron	Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru	General Support of ground forces
ADA Brigade	Dispersed to Bdes	General Support of ground forces
MP Bn	Pekanbaru	Defend Capital City, maintain public order
1st Inf Bde	vic Ujungbatu 0deg 42min N 100deg 30min E	Defend northern sector
2nd Inf Bde	vic Renat/Juapara 0deg 21min S 102deg 20min E	Defend southern sector
3rd Inf Bde	Dumai (NE Coast)	Defend City and Airport
1st Naval Inf Bde Hqs	Padang Naval Base	C2 defense of ASCM btry's, naval bases, & Padang
1st Naval Inf Bn	Riau Island	Defend Naval Base and Missile Btry
2nd Naval Inf Bn	vic Airbangis 0deg 7min N 99deg 23min E	Defend Missile Btry
3rd Naval Inf Bn	vic Gati (Pairganting on TPC Map M-10A) 2deg 01min S 100deg 53min E	Defend Missile Btry
4th Naval Inf Bn	SIberut Island 1deg 30min S 98deg 56mins E	Defend Missile Btry
5th Naval Inf Bn	Padang Naval Base	Defend town and Naval Base

Koppassus Support to Caliphate

- Caliphate agents subvert selected individuals in Koppassus units 4 and 5 on Java, vic Jakarta.
- Beginning 2014, subverted Koppassus operatives meet clandestinely with Caliphate sympathetic terrorist cells to plan terrorist attacks and sabotage operations directed against GOI, GOI military, and critical infrastructure.
- Evening of 1 Oct 2015, subverted operatives go underground and link up with terrorist cells to execute attacks/sabotage beginning 2 Oct.
- Koppassus characteristics
  - Members do not wear uniforms or follow military grooming standards.
  - Trained in counter-terrorist operations, kidnapping, assassinations, demolitions, and covert/clandestine operations.
  - Primarily based in Cijantung, East Jakarta.
  - Well positioned to attack APODs/SPODs, GOI, military hqs, and critical infrastructure in Jakarta.

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1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade

In mobile defense of SW Coast taking advantage of road network and better off road traffic ability of uplands inland from the beaches
Mission: Defend the SW coast, & Tabing Airport vic Padang

1st Bn Loc: Tabing Airport
2nd Bn Loc: 0⁰ 28'S 100⁰ 10' E
3rd Bn Loc: 1⁰ 10'S 100⁰ 28'E
4th Armor Bn Loc: Tabing Airport



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Infantry Brigade X 3

1st Inf Bde in the North
vic Ujungbatu 0° 42'N 100° 30' E
2nd Inf Bde in the South
vic Renat/Juapura 0° 21'S 102° 20' E
3rd Inf Bde in Dumai



2,560 Troops

1st Bde Mission: Defend northern se
2nd Bde Mission: Defend southern se
3rd Bde Mission: Defend Dumai & air



1st Artillery Brigade

1st FA & 5th MRL Bn's DS to 1st Inf Bde
2nd FA & 6th MRL Bn's DS to 2nd Inf Bde
3rd FA & 7th MRL Bn's DS to 3rd Inf Bde
4th FA Bn GS to units vic Pekanbaru
8th MRL Bn DS to 1st Mech Bde in Padang



ADA Brigade

Loc: 1st Bn vic Pekanbaru, 2nd Bn vic Padang, 3rd Bn DS to Bdes

Mission: Air defense of capital, port and airports.



All MANPAD have proximity fuses

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Palace Guard

(Mech Inf Bn)

Location: Peakabaru Govt Complex
Mission: Defend the Leadership



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1st Armor Battalion (Separate)

Loc: Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru
Mission: Defend airport, support other units if attacked.



UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Penkabaru Militia Infantry Battalion

Loc: Simpang Tiga Airport, Pekanbaru
Mission: Defend airport, support other units if attacked.



Aviation Squadron

Loc: Pekanbaru Airport
Mission: GS to Ground Forces



Pekanbaru Military Police Battalion

Loc: Pekanbaru
Mission: Defend City, maintain public order



UAV Battalion

-One attack UAV company
DS to maneuver bde's,
Naval Bde, & Palace Guard.

-One recon UAV company
DS to maneuver bde's,
Naval Bde, Arty Bde, &
Palace Guard.



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Naval Infantry Brigade x 1

- BDE mobilizes into 5 Bn TF's
  - 4 to defend ASCM Batteries
  - 1 to defend Padang Naval Base
- Riau Islands Bn defends Tanjungpinang Naval Base and Btry



3 x MANPAD
3xGPS Jammers

Per Bn
425-600 men

4 x SPG-9
18 x 60 mm Mortar
6 x 82mm Mortar
12 x AGS – 17
18 x SA-18
9 x AHURA (AT-99) ATGM (vehicle mounted)
9 motorcycles

30 x 120mm Mortars (T)
30 Prime Movers
35 Support Trucks

50 – ZSU-23 - 4

Coastal Defense BN

Batteries A, B, C YJ-83
6 TELs (3 msls ea)
18 msls per Btry
Battery D Combined Brty
2 TELs SS-N-22
(3 msls ea)
4 TELs SS-N-26
(3 msls ea)

Brty A and Bn TF 1
-Riau Islands
Brty B and Bn TF 2
-80nm NW of Padang
Btry C and Bn TF 3
-120 nm SE of Padang
Btry D and Bn TF 4
-Siberut Isle 60nm SW Padang
HQ and Bn TF 5 at Padang

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
C2/ISR
#1
Caliphate
Fiber/Ground Cable
(follows major roadways)
TARCS
(15k ft ALT 200nm coverage)
SOC
As of 1 Oct
fiber network
fully functional
Neither Red nor
Green have
moved to cut the
system

C2/ISR #2



No indigenous space based ISR
Red must have access to Commerci
Imagery/Intelligence

Communications/IO Infrastructure

Red's capital Pekanbaru is a hub of government, industry, commercial and academic facilities and has an up-to-date advanced commercial-off-the-shelf civilian and governmental communications system using fiber optics, cell-phones, wireless and satellite communications in addition to a functional legacy land-line phone system. Military and government systems are encrypted. A variety of military and commercial radios are used by the military and paramilitary tactical units when not in garrison. Couriers and other non-traditional means are used for sensitive communications.

Ibn Ander is fully "wired" and able to maintain situational awareness, command and control on the move.

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IO Capabilities

- Includes CNA, EW, PSYOPs, CC&D
  - Computer warfare, particularly the use of malicious software weapons such as computer viruses.
  - Denial of information and suppression, neutralization, and destruction of information and information sources, as well as defense against such techniques.
  - Psychological warfare, including both propaganda aimed at populations and deceptions or perception management operations targeted at decision-makers.
  - Effective CC&D counters three essential elements in the Blue military inventory: stealth aircraft, PGMs, and sophisticated information

IO Capabilities

- Computer Network Attack (CNA)
  - Special hacker/SOF units to probe, identify, and compromise Blue / Ally computer networks both indigenous and abroad.
  - Red sympathizers/anti-Blue Hackers disrupt Blue / Ally military/civilian computer networks.
- Computer Network Defense (CND)
  - In addition to techniques used in CC&D, computer network-based protective measures will be employed to ensure Red network protection.
    - Protective measures are scaleable to defensive posture or perceived threat.

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IO Capabilities

- Electronic Warfare (EW)
  - Major emphasis directed toward countering: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full dimensional protection.
  - Full spectrum capability – Air, Ground, Sea and Space
    - Kinetic/Non-Kinetic Weapons
      - **Directed Energy Weapons**
      - **Radio Frequency Weapons**
      - **Communication System Attack**

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IO Capabilities

- Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS)
  - Blue centers of gravity include political will, regional alliances, military logistics, and reliance on high technology.
  - Red strategic and military values place a premium on the use of PSYOPS to avoid conflict altogether.
    - Focus on exploiting Blue strengths.
    - Political leadership would likely mobilize all facets of the DIME+.

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IO Capabilities

- Camouflage Concealment & Deception (CC&D)
  - Counter Stealth
    - High-fidelity decoys, natural and artificial camouflage, and masking force deployments.
  - Counter Precision Guidance
    - Use of jamming, obscurants, spoofing and High-fidelity decoys
  - Counter Blue Information Networks
    - Use of detection, decoys, and false information

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

C2 – Communication Sectors (GOI)



WME SITES

Caliphate has limited Chem/Bio production, deploy and employ capability
Pekanbaru Afld
Tanjungpinang
Andalas University
WME Production Facility
WME Capable Military Acft
WME Capable UAV
WME TBM support sites
Additional ability to disperse agents with artillery, and small Acft (crop dusters)
0
120 NM
240 NM
Shah Alam
Kisaran
Tanjungbalai
Pematangsiantar
ACEH
Panguruan
Parapat
Porsea
Labuhanbilik
Balige
Siborongborong
Rantauprapat
SUMATERA
UTARA
Barus
Sibolga
Langgapayung
Gunungtua
Padangsidempuan
Gunungsitoli
Binanga
Pasarsibuhuan
Panyabungan
Kotanopan
Natal
Telukdalem
Labuhanrima
Airbangis
Equator
Talu
Kotapadang
Lubuksikaping
Payakumbuh
Bukittinggi
Tiku
Sawahlunto
Solok
Padang
Muarasigep
Bagansiapiapi
Melaka
MALAYSIA
Muar
Batu Pahat
Keluang
NEGERI
JOHOR
Johor Baharu
Singapore
Dumai
Bengkalis
Duri
Selatpanjang
Siak Sri Indrapura
Pekanbaru
Bangkinang
Rengat
Tembilahan
Taluk
Sungaidarch
Tanjungbalai
Tanjungpinang
Simpang
Muaratebo
JAMBI
Jambi
Muaratembesi
Belinyu
Muntok
Airhaji
Gati
Sungaipenuh
Bangko
Mukomuko
Surulangun
BENGKULU
BARAT
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GPS Exclusion Zones (estimated)

High value facilities/equipment will be protected with GPS jammer's and CC&D techniques

Red Team's Assessment of Caliphate Most Likely COA

- "Outwit, Outlast, Survive"
- If the GOI collapses before Red is defeated and destroyed, then Red may able to sue for peace and a negotiated settlement.
- Details provided in Red Campaign Plan

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Red Team's Assessment of Caliphate Most Dangerous COA

- "Tet Offensive II"
- Red plans to use all aspects of its political and military power to inflict maximum casualties and damage to the Coalition and the GOI in hopes that public opposition to the war will force a negotiated settlement

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VARIOUS Indonesian INSURGENT GROUPS:

Name	Base Area	Est. Strength
Free Aceh Movement	**Sumatra**	**8,500**
Laskar Jihad	**Java**	**6,500**
Jemaah Islamiah	**Java/Southern Malaysia**	**3,200**
Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia /Central Sulawesi/ Central Kalimantan (Borneo)	Eastern Malaysia	4,600
Laskar Mujahideen	Maluku Islands/Western Timor	1,200
Islamic Defenders Front	Java	900
Abu Sayyaf /Northern Sulawesi	S. Philippines/N Kalimantan	1,000
Papuan Liberation Front	Iryan Jaya (Papua)	1,800

- With the exception of the Papuan Liberation Front, the insurgent groups were Islamic radical fundamentalists dedicated to the creation of the Islamic State of Daulah Islamiah Nusntara.
- Free Aceh, Laskar Jihad, and Jemaah Islamiah have connections with the Caliphate

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Sumatra
Malaysia
Java
alimantan (Borneo)
Sulawesi
Makuku Islands
West Timor
Iryan Java (Papua)

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Scenario “Bad Actors”

- MG (ret) Nur Muis Ibn Ander
- Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia (MMI)
- Islamist Military Faction (Tinju Islam, TI)

Islamist Faction of Military "Tinju Islam" (TI)

- Demographics of armed forces officer corps changes to reflect Indonesian society (from secular to mixed)
- 30% of officer corps considered "Islamist"
- Competing with traditional nationalist / secular officers
- As a group resent Javanese domination of highest levels of command
- Open to "dialogue" with MMI concerning Islamic State
- Key members:
  - **Lt Gen Subagyo Anwar** (Dep COS of Army)
  - **Maj Gen Prabowo Sutarto** (Army SF Commander)
  - **Maj Gen Wiyotomo Isnaeni** (Dep Commander of Strategic Reserve)
  - **MG (ret) Nur Muis Ibn Ander** (Governor of Riau and Sumatra Barat provinces)

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Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

- A council of hard-core conservative Islamic terrorist leaders who exert considerable influence in the GOI Legislature.
- By 2015, has morphed into a social advocate / political organization acting as a coordinating council for terrorist groups operating in GOI.
- Anti-government, anti-elite, anti-Chinese, pro-Islamic state group that is a natural ally for Ibn Ander.

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Majelis Mujahadin Indonesia

MMI
(The Umbrella Organization)

Terrorists

Jemaah Islamiyah

Abu Bakar Bashir
verall Spiritual and MMI Leader

daun Isamuddin (Hambali)

Paramilitary

Laskar Jihad

Ja'far Umar Thalib

MMI Connection to:

- **Al-Qaeda**
- **Hamas**
- **Hezbollah**

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MMI / TI Longterm Strategy

- Islamic group **Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)** develops two track approach to pursuit of **Islamic state**
  - **Overt**: Develop "grassroots" **social and political** movement
    - Provide services to poor in slums of Jakarta (schools, healthcare, food) with funding from **Wahabi donors**
    - Espouse **peaceful** creation of **Islamic state**
    - Become **advocate** for poor in **legislature**
  - **Covert**: Become "**umbrella**" organization for domestic and international **terrorist groups** in Indonesia
    - Ally with two violent domestic Islamic groups: **Jemaah Islamiyah** and **Laskar Jihad**
    - Strengthen links to **Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah**, who are known to be seeking **WMD**
    - Ally with the Islamic faction of **military**
- Ultimate Goal: **create anarchy**, discredit government, **in concert with Islamic military officers take control** and create an Islamic state

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China's Strategic Situation

China Strategic Goals

- Develop capability to compete with U.S. as “near-peer” in certain niches
- Secure guaranteed access to critical natural resources (oil and natural gas)
- Develop capability to exert “deniable” DImE leverage on competitors
- Avoid being cast as a “bad actor” on the world stage

China: In Search of Leverage

- Never-ending pursuit of asymmetric advantage against the U.S. (Assassin's Mace)
- Manufacture and export of low-cost quality goods
- Promote expansion by Chinese companies into other countries
- Sale of military hardware and training to "clients"
- Choke Point Strategy (DImE)
  - Develop influential relationships with key client states enabling control of SLOCs

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CHOKE POINTS

(China Perspective)



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Choke Point Strategy



- Part of global DIME Strategy
- Re-creates use of Client States
- Offset to U.S. military advantage thru mostly economic and diplomatic means
- **D** - China provides diplomatic cover for Islamist governments and movements stressing their activities are “internal affairs”
- **D** - China maintains a “non-interference” stance in the UN
- **D** - Gain increased presence and influence with governments and radical movements (with plausible deniability)
- **I** - Portray China as supportive of Islam
- **m/E** - China provides military hardware and training

Choke Point Strategy



- **I/E**: China is able to influence th
flow and supply of oil to Asia thrc
normal diplomatic and economic
activities
- **E** - Iran and Indonesia: source of oil as suppliers / geography
- **E** - Yemen has unexploited oil fields / geography
- **E** – Morocco - no oil but occupies critical geography

Reality: China's access enables them to influence the chokepoints through their client states at little public risk to themselves

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Friendly Situation

GOI Situation

Background

- **GOI Military increased its professionalism and modernization**
- **Received increased U.S. military assistance**
- **Counterbalanced Chinese military influence**
- **By 2014 military units on Sumatra led and manned by officers from the area**
- **Ibn Ander used the local officers to subvert the the units in his area.**

Current Situation

- GOI Forces on island slowly closing in from North West and South but still not in contact with Red. Northern force delayed by downed bridges. GOI Division (Rein) on Java will be ready to move via commercial sealift in 6-12 days. Requires secure port of entry.

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GOI OOB

- 1 Infantry Division (Rein)
- 2 Infantry Brigades
- 1 Artillery Brigade (-)
- 1 Militia Brigade

Third Party Situation

Third Party Interests

- India and China provided units for TF Swashbuckler but not for CTF Blue
- They voted for UN support of CTF Blue, but they have restive Muslim minorities and did not want to be seen as conducting offensive operations against Muslims
- Both countries expressed strong curiosity in what promised to become the largest combat operations in the region since the Vietnam War
- Their requests that liaison officers ride the USN ships were politely refused

Third Party Interests (cont)

- Submarines and AGI's (fishing boats with no nets but lots of antennas) from both countries have been spotted apparently heading for the CTF Blue JOA possibly to "observe" the operations
- India and China and the Caliphate all operate the same type subs as the Caliphate
- 2 Indian and 1 Chinese subs are operating in or near the JOA
- Neither Nation have observed "INCSEA" type protocols in previous encounters with US Naval forces
- Their surveillance platforms often get dangerously close to US platforms

The OE – Terrain, Weather, Infrastructure & Information

Operational Environment: 2002-2015

Strategic Setting

- **Regional conflict with strategic consequences … potential emergence for major competitor**
- **Competition for scarce, valuable resources (Oil, natural gas)**
- **Ethnic rivalry …Indonesian vs. Chinese**
- **Religious animosity … Christian and Muslim, others (Hindu)**
- **Remnant of colonialism … may go the way of Yugoslavia**
- **Strategic location … friction point for regional players (China, Japan, Australia, US and UK)**

Crisis Environment – Operational Battlespace

- **Sizable AOR with varied geography and weather / diverse terrain**
- **Highly dense population centers (megacities)**
- **Fragile and declining infrastructure**
- **Increased internal criminal acts**

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Operational Environment: 2002-2015+

The Adversary

- **Adaptive – fully understands his battlespace and his enemy**
- **Will exploit perceived vulnerabilities and leverage available technologies**
  - ✓ **Deny, limit, interrupt or delay US entry (nature of terrain favors adversary)**
  - ✓ **Shield by deliberate actions to counter C4ISR and neutralize air and missile forces**

Operational Dilemma – 2010-2015+

- **An Independence movement by a popular and powerful regional leader threatens to "balkanize" Indonesia.**
- **GOI and fledgling democracy in danger of collapse**
- **Time is on Ibn Ander's side.**
- **GOI military…large but low to medium tech force**
- **China's power projection is capable of intervening if conditions deteriorate**

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Indonesia Terrain

Littoral Penetration Area and Mobility Corridor Study SV04

References: Tactical Pilotage Charts TPC L-10D, L-10C and M-10A
Nautical Chart 71261 for Dumai
(See speaker notes for detailed description of corridors and beaches)



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Mobility Corridor's (MC)



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
MC's& LPA's
Dumai
Airbangis
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Tiku to
Paluangan
Airport North
& South
Telukabjur
Malaju
Palau
Sikowai
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Tjarotjok
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Gunungtua
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SUMATERA UTARA
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Port Data

Teluk Bayur
Padang Commercial Port

- **Major cargo and passenger port, 3 Miles south of Padang**
- **Posted plans will greatly increase capacity.**
- **Scenario doubles Wharf space and cargo handling capacity and increases harbor depth from 9-12 meters to 12-15 meters .**
- **Detailed text in Speaker Notes**



INDONESIA PORT II
PORT OF TELUK BAYUR

Port of Dumai

- The port of Dumai is at lat 01 41N 101 27E it is a very small harbor in a river basin with good shelter. The channel is 46-50 feet deep, the anchorage and cargo piers have 41-45 feet of water, it can handle a vessel over 500 feet long. This data is consistent with its function as a major oil terminal. It has fixed and floating cranes with a max lift of 24 tons. Water, fuel oil and diesel oil are available but not provisions. No repair facilities are available. It has a very long, narrow and easily mined shipping channel to the strait.

Regional Airfield Data

Regional Airfields



Planning Factors:
Minimum Runway Requirements*

A/C Type	
C-130H	**3000 ft**
C-17	**3000 ft**
C-5 M	**6000 ft**

***Source: USAF XOOW GE VI Log Planning Guide**

Strait of Malacca

- Busiest Shipping Lane in the World, 50,000+ ocean going vessels transit a year.
- Thousands of fishing boats and local cargo ships present.
- 1 1/2 miles wide at narrowest point
- CPA's of <500 yds
- Safe standoff distances can not be maintained.
- Pirates and Terrorists could "hide" in plain sight.
- Waters too crowded to safely operate large naval task force or seabase in peace time, much less in war.

Caliphate

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Terrain

- **Nation is three times the size of Texas**
- **Total national territory 5.2 million km: over 50,000 km of coastline**
- **17,508 islands total: 90% of land mass on five islands**
- **6,000 inhabited islands**
- **Worlds most volcanic active region: >100 active volcanoes**
- **Peak elevations range from 9,780’ to over 16,400’**

Vegetation

- **Peak elevations range from 9,780’ to over 16,400’**
- **Triple canopy jungle occurs from coastline to 3,000’**
- **Above 3,000’ jungle gives way to scrub brush**
- **Numerous rivers and swamps throughout Indonesia**

Terrain Implications

GOI

- Dismounted Ops
  - Relief, mountains
  - Jungle
  - Swamps
- Mounted Ops
  - Roads
  - Off-Road

Red

- Dismounted Ops
  - Relief – mountains
  - Jungle
  - Swamps
- Mounted Ops
  - Roads
  - Off-Road

- Well-developed road system allows mounted operations (primarily road-bound)
- Numerous small bridges may limit movement of heavy vehicles
- Mounted Off-road mobility very difficult
  - swampy terrain along east coast
  - dense jungle elsewhere
- Terrain better suited for dismounted small unit operations

MISSIONS IMPACTED <25% OF TIME MISSIONS IMPACTED >25% OF TIME MISSIONS IMPACTED >50% OF TIME

Indonesia Weather

Weather Conditions will not prohibit operations

Sumatra vs Java Climatology

* Main variable is rainfall linked to monsoon shift
  -Rainy season (Nov-Mar)
  -Wettest month in Sumatra is Dec and Jan in Java
  -Dry season (Apr-Oct) more pronounced in Java
* Temperature uniform year-round (70s at night/80s during the day)
  -Cooler in high areas with frost and snow
* Afternoon thunderstorms throughout the region are common especially
during the rainy season
* Low clouds/visibility are common during morning hours and more frequent
in Sumatra
* Generally winds are moderate and predictable
 -From S and E during dry season
 -From N and W during the rainy season
 -Local topography will produce significant variation

Weather Implications

Sumatra (Apr-Oct)

- **Air operations**
  - **heavy rainfall**
- **Dismounted Ops**
  - **Heat / Humidity**
- **SSM Operations**
  - **Heavy rainfall**
- **Mounted Ops**
  - **Flooding**
- **Air transport ops**
  - **limited VFR conditions**

Java (Apr-Oct)

- **Air operations**
  - **heavy rainfall**
- **Dismounted Ops**
  - **Heat / Humidity**
- **SSM Operations**
  - **Heavy rainfall**
- **Mounted Ops**
  - **Flooding**
- **Air transport ops**
  - **limited VFR conditions**

MISSIONS IMPACTED <25% OF TIME **MISSIONS IMPACTED ≥25% OF TIME** **MISSIONS IMPACTED ≥50% OF TIME**

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Weather



- Indonesia lies along the equatorial zone: temp/humidity perennially high
- Mountainous nature of terrain causes sharp variations in weather
- Rain fall is heavy year round: (40-78 inches avg)
  - South-facing coasts and southern islands most affected by ‘south’ monsoon (May-Sep)
  - Northward-facing coasts and northern islands most affected by ‘north’ monsoon (Nov-Mar)

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Weather Implications

GOI

- Air operations (helo, UAV)
  - heavy rainfall
- Air transport ops
  - limited VFR conditions
- CAS
  - Clouds @ 3000ft +
- Dismounted Ops
  - Heat / Humidity
- Mounted Ops
  - Flooding

Caliphate

- Air operations (helo, UAV)
  - heavy rainfall
- Air transport ops
  - limited VFR conditions
- CAS
  - Clouds @ 3000ft +
- Dismounted Ops
  - Heat / Humidity
- Mounted Ops
  - Flooding

MISSIONS IMPACTED <25% OF TIME MISSIONS IMPACTED >25% OF TIME MISSIONS IMPACTED >5O% OF TIME

Astronomical Data

Penkanbaru

2018

Sunrise – Sunset
All Times Local (+7)

- October 1st
- October 15th
- October 31st

- 0532 – 1739
- 0529 – 1735
- 0526 – 1732

Moon Data

- New Moon
- Full Moon

- October 9th
- October 25th

More complete data is being gathered.

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Water Conditions Provided on Website

Water Depth

(less than 100 m/328 feet/55 fathoms)

Tides, Currents, Hydrography and Beach Data

on website

Indonesia Infrastructure

Transportation Network ...

- **Roads: remain most important form of travel for passengers & freight**
- **477,000 km of national, provincial and district roads**
  - **65% good to moderate condition; 43% paved with asphalt**
- **Rail: 6,964 km of railways on Java, Madura and Sumatra (all Govt owned)**
- **Air: O 111 have perman t 747 type aircraft**

- Numerous rivers and swamps drain primarily towards the north coast
- 45,000 km roads – 60% paved

Transportation - Major Ports

Indonesia contains 21,579 kilometers of inland waterways

Kalimantan 10,000 k
Sumatra 5,471 k
Irian Jaya 4,587 k
Java and Madura 820k
Celebes 241 k

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Indonesia / Sumatra / West Sumatra

- **West Sumatra is composed of three regions: volcanic highlands, a long coastal plane and a series of jungle-covered islands just offshore. Much of the province is still wilderness; virgin jungle inhabited by elephants, tigers, leopards and rhinos. It is the traditional homeland of the Minangkabau, who are known far and wide through the archipelago for their shrewd business sense, their firey-hot dishes and ancient matriarchal customs. The women own property and the men leave home to seek their fame and fortune. Traveling is considered a mark of success and West Sumatrans and their Minang or Padang restaurants are found in all major towns across the nation. The people are hospitable and eloquent, with a poetic style of speech. West Sumatran days are filled with colorful ceremonies and festivals. Legend has it the Minangkabau are descendants of the youngest son of Alexander the Great, King Maharjo Dirajo.**
- **West Sumatra's center of culture and tourism is Bukittinggi, nestled in the highlands north of the provincial capital of Padang. Surrounded by high mountains, picturesque valleys and lakes, Bukittinggi considered by many tourists to be the most hospitable city in all of Sumatra.**
- **Padang's Tabing Airport is the main gateway to west Sumatra and is serviced by Merpati Nusantara airline. The MV Kerinci sails every two weeks for Jakarta from Teluk Bayur harbour at Padang. Smaller vessels from Muara harbour at Padang sail to small towns along the entire West coast of Sumatra. Regular bus services run between Padang, Bukittinggi and other major cities of Sumatra, as well as via the Trans-Sumatra Highway to Jakarta.**

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Indonesia / Sumatra / Riau

- **The 3,000 Islands of the Rim province straddle the Straits of Malacca, one of the oldest and busiest trading routes in the world. For centuries the islands have provided a safe haven to traders and sailors from Europe, India and China, retaining today the flavor of an ancient 'crossroads of the world'. The romantic history of this region is rich with tales of piracy and inter-national conflict. Riau, which includes a large part of East Sumatra, is homeland to the Malays and the source of Indonesia's Malay-based national language. The first book of Malay grammar, called Bustanul Katibin, was written and published here in 1857.**
- **Since its founding in 1402 by Parameswara, the Kingdom of Malacca played a leading role in the history of the area. With the arrival of the Portuguese a period of wars for control of the Straits began. The situation was aggravated by the arrival of the Dutch and British in the early 17th century.**
- **A turbulent conflict followed, which was partially resolved by the Treaty of London in 1824, giving the Dutch control of all European territories south of Singapore. This area Included Riau, and effectively severed its links with Johor and the mainland. The Dutch subjugated and dissolved the rebellious Riau Sultanate in 1911, but the province's Influence remained strong.**
- **Pekanbaru in Sumatra became the provincial capital in 1959, taking over from the former capital of Tanjungpinang on the Island of Bintan. Tanjung-pinang is, however, still the most Important town in the province. Its proximity to Singapore has made it a main business and shopping port and together with the nearby island of Batani, it is promising to become an area of major investment and development in the years ahead. The future looks bright for Riau; because of its strategic position with the rest of Asia it is rapidly being developed as a major economic zone.**

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Indonesia Information

Communication Network

...

- **Telephone: Continued development of telecommunications systems (result of early investments in satellite communication)**
  - **130+ earth stations support long-distance direct dialing to over 140 cities (allow international direct dialing to 147 countries)**
  - **266+ automatic telephone exchanges and 480 manual exchanges: capacity of 1 million telephone lines. (Ranks 23rd in world)**
  - **Cellular phone operations and coverage continue to expand: Ranks 39th in World)**
- **Television: Dominated by govt networks: 18 – govt owned and 8 private**

  Satellite communication carries television signals to every village in

  the country (member of INTELSAT)
  - **11.8 million TVs, or 58 per 1,000 people (Ranks 17th in world)**
- **Radio: 530 medium-wave, 140 short-wave**
  - **VOI broadcasts in Arabic, Chinese, English, French,**

Indonesia Cell Phone Coverage -20

Almost all the the Caliphate has Cell phone coverage

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Christmas Island



Christmas Island

Christmas Island is an Australian external Territory, located in the Indian Ocean at latitude 10º25'19"S, longitude 105º42'57"E. The island is approximately 360 km south of Jakarta, Indonesia, and 2650 km northwest of Perth, Western Australia.

The airport was upgraded to support the Asian Pacific Launch Center, has a 2,650m paved runway and can accommodate 747-400, Anatov 124-100. The apron can accommodate an aircraft larger than a 737. Support and refueling is very limited.

The island's 80 kilometre coastline is an almost continuous sea cliff, of up to 20 metres in height. In a few places, the cliff gives way to shallow bays with small sand and coral shingle beaches. The largest of these bays forms the island's main port; Flying Fish Cove.

The island is surrounded by a narrow encircling coral reef. There is virtually no coastal shelf, and the sea plummets to a depth of about 500 metres within 200 metres of the shore.

The Asian Pacific Launch Center is located on the South

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Christmas Island
Flying Fish Cove



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Additional Port Facility



The Christmas Island ports have offshore mooring facilities to accommodate 100m long container vessels
The Additional Port Facility is used when Flying Fish Cove is closed by swells.
See speaker notes for more details

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Indonesia Economics

Indonesia Resources and Production



The Caliphate has Electronics, Heavy Engineering, Chemical, Oil, Oil Refining and Timber Industries

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Indonesia Agriculture Regions

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Indonesia Administrative Regions



The Caliphate includes both Sumatera Barat and Riau Providences

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Indonesia – Oil and Natural Gas



Number	Location	Oil Field	Gas Field	Geothermal
1	NORTH SUMATERA	Rantau	Arun	Sibayak
2	CENTRAL SUMATERA	Minas	Libo	Lempur
		Duri		
3	SOUTH SUMATERA	Tl.Akar	Musi	-
		Rambe	Betung	
		Jene	Rawa	
4	WEST JAVA	Jati Barang	Jati Barang	Kamojang
		Cemara	Parigi	Darajat
		Arjuna	Subang	Cisolok
		Arimbi	-	Banten
		Widuri	-	Wayang Windu
		-	-	Salak
5	CENTRAL JAVA	-	-	Dieng
6	EAST JAVA	Poleng	-	-
		Camar		
		Kawengan		

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Indonesia – Oil and Natural Gas (cont)



Number	Location	Oil Field	Gas Field	Geothermal
7	EAST JAVA (MADURA ISLAND)	-	Pangerungan	-
8	SOUTH KALIMANTAN	Tanjung	-	-
9	EAST KALIMANTAN	Attaka	Badak	-
		Bekapai	Nilam	
		-	Handil	
10	EAST KALIMANTAN	Bunyu	-	-
		Tarakan		
11	SOUTH SULAWESI	-	Kampung Baru	-
12	NORTH SULAWESI	-	-	Lahendong
13	MALUKU	Bula	-	-
14	IRIAN JAYA	Sorong	Wiriagar Deep	-
		Walio	Tangguh	
		Kasim	-	
		Cendrawasih	-	
		Klamono		
15	WEST SUMATERA	Muara	Tarok	

Production Rankings

Oil-8th Natural Gas- 12st (2014)

UNCLASSIFIED FO



Recoverable Crude Oil Futures (in billions of barrels)

0.1	0.1 to 1	1 to 10	10 to 20	20 to 100	>100

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Indonesia
Sociology

Indonesia Population Distribution- World's 4th

Ethnic Breakdown

Javanese	**45%**	**Madurese**	**8%**
Other	**26%**	**Coastal Malays**	**8%**
Sundanese	**14%**		

Religious Breakdown

Muslim	**87%**	**Hindu**	**2%**
Protestant	**6%**	**Buddhist**	**1%**
Roman Catholic	**3%**		

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Indonesia – Principal Power Plants

No Nuclear Power Plants

Indonesia Politics

Indonesia Top Leaders

President Soeharto

Vice President General (Ret) Sutrisno

Indonesia Political Situation

-Indonesia President serves as both head of state and chief executive

-The General Assembly which was held from March 1-11, 2012, re-elected President Soeharto to his fifth term of office for the next five years

-General (Ret) Try Sutrisno was elected as the Vice President and will serve year term

-Major concern of the Government is the creation of an efficient, clean and respectable administration

-The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into 27 provinces are subdivided into 241 districts, 56 municipalities and 3,625 sub-districts o kecamatans

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Structure Of Government (1of 2)

Legislative Bodies:

-People's Consultative Assembly (MPR): the highest constitutional body whi
every five years. The principal task of the MPR is to approve the Broad Outl
State Policies.

-House of People's Representatives (DPR): 500 member body meets annual
Opening on August 16, the eve of National Day when the president delivers
National Day speech.

The Executive:

-The President: Indonesia government is a strong presidential system. The
is elected for a five year term by a majority vote of the MPR. Only qualificat
office is that the president be a native-born Indonesia citizen.

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Structure Of Government (2 of 2)

-The Cabinet: Of the thirty-eight members of the Fifth Development Cabine
held the same positions in the Fourth Development Cabinet, nine continued
Cabinet but different posts and nineteen were new ministers.

-The Supreme Advisory Council: Is mandated by Article 16 of the constituti
Forty-five member group nominated by the DPR and appointed by the presi

-The Judiciary: Article 24 of the constitution states that judicial power shall
Vested in a Supreme Court and subordinate courts established by law.

-The State Audit Board: Functions are outlined in Article 23 of the constituti
function is to conduct official examinations of government financial account

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Tech Base

Caliphate Maritime



Kilo 877 EKM SSK

Displacement	2,300 tons surfaced 3,000 tons submerged
Speed	10-12 kts surfaced 17-25 kts submerged dash
Dimension	238 ft
Diving Depth	800 ft operational 1,000 ft maximum
Endurance	6,000 nm on snorkel @ 7kts 400 nm submerged @ 3kts 13 nm submerged @ 21kts
Weapons	18 torpedoes or 24 mines

Kilo 636 SSK Improved Kilo 877 EKM
Much quieter, faster, longer range



Amur (project 1650) SSK

Fourth generation diesel-electric submarine, Kilo 636 follow-on

Displacement	1,850 tons surfaced 2,600 tons submerged
Speed	10 kts surfaced 22 kts submerged dash
Dimension	223 ft
Diving Depth	820 ft maximum
Range	6,000 nm on snorkel 500 nm submerged @ 3 KTS
Endurance	50 days
With AIP	95 day with Kristall-27E AIP
Weapons	18 SS-N-27 ASCM, 18 torpedoes

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Caliphate Maritime

Valour Class FFG

(Meko A-200 Low Signature Corvette)
Displacement 3500 tons
2x4 Cell MM 40 Exocet Launchers
2X5 Cell Unkhonto SAM launchers
76mm OtoBrenda DP gun
27+ kts
1 SuperLynx Helo

Houxin Class (Improved) PTG

Missile Patrol Boat
Displacement 478 tons
Weapons
C-803 ASCM
2 – dual 30mm
32 kts

Caliphate Maritime

Scorpion (Project 12300) PGM

Displacement 470 tons
8 SS-N-26 (Yakhont)
38 kts

China CAT (C-14) PGM

Displacement 19 tons
8 C-701 ASCM
50 kts

Caliphate Maritime

Kakap (PB-57) Nav V PGM

Displacement 425 tons
MM-40 Exocet ASCM
40mm gun
NBO-105 Helicopter
28 kts

Lurssen New 28 meter PBF

Surveillance and targeting
Displacement 85 tons
7.62 mm MG
40 kts

Caliphate Maritime

Parchim I PG

Displacement 769 tons
Twin 57 mm
24 knots
Fitted with mine rails

Tacoma LST

Displacement 3750 tons
1 NAS-332 Super Puma helo

Caliphate Maritime



Palau Rengat (Tripartite) MHSC

Displacement 568 tons

Dimension 169 ft

15 knots

Caliphate Maritime

Gladiator 36 Drone (by Cigarette)

Remote controlled composite construction

Displacement	3.3 tons
Dimension	37 ft
Speed	75 kts
Range	217nm @ 40 kts

Stingray Jetski Drone (by AD&D)

Remote controlled marine vehicle
Low radar/IR/acoustic signature
High seas operation capability
Autonomous operation

Dimension	7 ft
Speed	40 kts
Endurance	12 hr
Payload	265 lb HE

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Caliphate Maritime



SS-N-27 (3M54E) Klub ASCM

Land, Surface, or Subsurface launched sea skimming active homing cruise missile with supersonic terminal phase

Range:	108 nm / 220 km
Speed:	Mach 2.9
Warhead:	440 lbs / 200 kg

Exocet MM 40 Block II, Mod 2 ASCM

Sea skimming inertial, active homing cruise missile

Range:	40 nm / 75 km
Speed:	Mach 0.9
Warhead:	340 lbs / 155 kg

Caliphate Maritime

SS-N-22 (3M82) Sunburn ASCM

Air, land, or surface launched sea skimming active homing supersonic cruise missile

Range	135 nm / 250 km
Speed	Mach 3.0
Warhead:	700 lbs / 320 kg

SS-N-26 (P-800)Yakhont ASCM

Land, surface, or subsurface launched sea skimming active homing cruise missile

Range with mixed profile	162 nm / 300 km
Range with low profile	65 nm / 120 km
Speed	Mach 2-2.5
Warhead:	440 lbs / 200 kg

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Caliphate Maritime

C-701 ASCM

Light-weight, solid rocket, semi-active homing cruise missile

Range	11 nm / 20 km
Speed	Mach 0.8
Warhead:	220 lbs / 100 kg

YJ-83 (C-803) ASCM

Land, surface, or subsurface launched sea skimming active homing cruise missile

Range km	135 nm / 250
Speed	Mach 0.9
Warhead kg	365 lbs / 165

Caliphate Maritime

53-65 KE torpedo

Anti-surface vessel wake homing torpedo

Range (coastal defense system)	20 nm / 37 km
Range (submarine to ship)	10 nm / 19 km
Speed	55 kts
Warhead:	672 lbs / 305 kg

Test 71ME-NK torpedo

Wire guided wake homing anti-surface vessel and anti-sub-surface torpedo

Range	10 nm / 18 km at 20 kts 8 nm / 15 km at 40 kts
Warhead	452 lbs / 205 kg

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment

CN-235 MPA

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Range: 3650 km

Endurance: >8 Hours

Armament: AGM-84 Harpoon or AM-39 Exocet air-launched ASM

Boeing 737 AEW

Radar Air and Maritime 200 + nm /All Weather

IFF: 300 nm

Endurance: 9 Hours

Range: 7,000 km

Red Equipment

SU-25 Frogfoot

Ground Attack

Range: 1,250 km w droptanks

Armament: 4,440 kg;
Cannon: 1 GSh-6-N-30 30mm rotary
AS-7/9/11/12, AA-8 Aphid, FAB-250, UV-32-57, FAB-500, 500kg LGB, FAB-250

SU-30MKI Flanker

Strike Fighter

Range: 3000 km

Armament: One 30 mm cannon up to 6,000 kg payload
- AA-10 (Alamo) air-to-air missiles
- AA-11 (Archer) air-to-air missiles
- AS-17 Supersonic ASCM

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment



AS-17 Krypton ASCM

Range: 50Km

Speed: Mach 3.5

Warhead: 90kg

MI-8 HIP

Multi-role Transport_
24 troops or 3000 kg cargo

Range: 350 km Max load

Weapons: 12.7mm MG
57 / 83mm
Rockets
AT-2/3 ATGM

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment …

SA-10

- Primary Red surface-to-air missile capability
- Mobile (Range 49NM)
- Prepared hide sites in both Urban and Jungle settings
- Redundant C2 links to IADS

Red Equipment

Scud-C SRBM

Range: 500 km

Guidance: Inertial

CEP: 500m

Warhead: 700kg throw weight; Chem, High Explosive

Fuel: Liquid

CSS-7 SRBM

Range: 300Km

Guidance: Inertial

CEP: 300m

Warhead: 500kg throw weight; Chem, High Explosive, Cluster

Fuel: Solid

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment

300 mm MRL

Range 100-120 Km

Warheads: Course Corrected, THM, FRAG, FASCAM, Thermobarics

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122 mm MRL

Range 12-32 Km

Warheads: Smoke, Incendiary, Chemical, RF Jammer, Illumination, Antitank mines, Antipersonnel mines

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment



SPG-9 Recoilless Rifle

Range 1300m direct fire (AT)

4500m indirect fire (AP)

Warheads: AT Shaped

Fragmentation



120mm Mortar ADHPM

Range: Dependent on Platform

Guidance: Laser Guided

Munitions: HE-Frag/Unitary Heat/Radiofrequency

Red Equipment …



Top Attack Mine

Sensors:
Infrared/Acoustics

Range 80-125 mm

Warhead : EFP

Anti-Helicopter Mine

Sensors:
Acoustics/Radar

Range 150-250 meters

Warhead: Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP)

Red Equipment …

RPG 29

Range: 1000 meters

Caliber: 105 MM

Day /Night sight

Munitions: Anti tank-750 mm penetration/ Antipersonnel / Thermobaric

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

RPO-A Flame Launcher

Range: 600-1000 meters

Day /Night sight

Munitions: Thermobaric

Red Equipment ...

Skyshield

Armament: 35mm gun system

Primary targets

tactical fighter aircraft

Helicopters

Multisensor fire control AHEAD Ammunition

G-6 (FO) 155mm

Armament: 155mm gun w/ 45 rounds

Range: 60,000 meters(w/ extended projectiles)

Crew: 6

Weight: 52 tons

SKYSHIELD Engaging Cruise Missile



Red Equipment

Side Attack Mine

Sensors: Acoustics/Radar

Range 150-250 meters

Warhead: Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP)

Directed Energy Weaponry

ZM-87

Laser Dazzler vs optics and sights

Range 2KM

Note: Tank Mounted Version on Type 98

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Red Equipment



AHURA (AT-99 ATGM)

Fire and Forget BLOS

Lock On After Launch

12KM Range

1250 mm Penetration

PAH-2 Tiger Attack Helo

Armament:
- **up to 2x22 rockets**
- **up to 2x12 rocket pods**
- **up to 2x2 Mistral air-to-air missiles**
- **up to 2x4 HOT anti-tank missiles**
- **30 mm turreted gun**

Avionics: radar/laser warning receivers

Detect ability: low visual, radar and infrared

Range: 800km; 432nm

Cruise Speed: 150kts

Endurance: 3 hrs 25 mins

BO-105 Recce Helo

Armament:
- **2 - 2.75-in rocket pods (7 or 12 ea.)**
- **2 - 68-mm SNEB rocket pods (12ea)**
- **2 - 50-mm SNIA rockets (28 ea.)**
- **2 - TOW ATGM pods (4 ea.)**
- **6 - HOT ATGM**
- **2 - AS-12 ASM pods (2 ea.)**
- **1 - Stinger AAM pod (4 ea.)**

Avionics: weather radar, Doppler & GPS navigation

Detect ability: infrared signature suppressors

Range: 555km

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Super Lynx

Utility, Attack, Anti-tank

Armament: Cannon, minigun, rockets, missiles, HOT or TOW antitank missiles

NAS 532 Super Puma

Multi-Role Helo

- 7.65-mm MG
- 2 - 20-mm twin gun pods
- 2 - 68-mm rocket pods (22 each)
- 2 - 2.75-in rocket pods (19 each)
- 600 liters External fuel tanks

Mi-17 Helicopter

Armament:
- **2x 7.62-mm or 1x 12.7-mm MG**
- **4-6 - AT-2C or AT-3 ATGMs**
- **4-6 - 57-mm rocket pods (16 each)**
- **2 - 80-mm rocket pods (20 each)**
- **4 - 250-kg bombs**
- **2 - 500-kg bombs**
- **1 - 12.7-mm MG pod**
- **2 - Twin 23-mm gun pods**

Transports 24 troops

Avionics: Doppler radar; autopilot; day/night/ instrument meteorological conditions; IR jammer; chaff/flares

Range: 495km

Cruise Speed: 240km/hr

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

Centauro B1

Armament: 120mm main gun; 7.62mm MG

Range: 2km

-APFSDS ammo

-Thermal imager & laser range finder

-Stabilized turret

Weight: 21 tons

Speed: 105+ km/hr

ERA: protects against 20mm

VBC 8 X 8 Troop Carrier

Armament: 25mm auto cannon; 7.62mm MG

-Thermal imager & laser range finder

-Stabilized turret

Crew: 3 plus 8 troops

Weight: 21 tons

Speed: 105+ km/hr

ERA: protects against 20mm

UNCLASSIFIED FOUO

SA-19 Grisom

Armament: 12 - 57E6 SAMs

Range: 1000 – 12,000m

Altitude: 5 – 8000m

Guidance: radio commands with IR or radio direction finding

Radar: detection – 30km

tracking – 24km

Warhead: frag, 16kg

Puma 4x4 Recon Vehicle

Armament:

- 7.62mm or 12.7mm MG

- ATGM launcher

Range:

Crew: driver; 6 troops

Weight: 5.7 tons

Speed: 100+ km/hr

Armor protection: small arms up to 7.62mm all over; 12.7mm in front

ZSU 23-4 (SHILKA) **SP AA GUN**

USED BY WARSAW PACT AND THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

PROMINENT RADAR DISH CAN BE FOLDED DOWN

MODIFIED PT-76 CHASSIS



TURRET MOUNTS 4X23-MM AA GUN (MAX SLANT RANGE 3,000M)

EMPLOYED IN PAIRS 200M APART, 400M BEHIND BN LEADING ELEMENTS

EASILY CONFUSED WITH: M247 AND GEPARD

Red Equipment

MAD DOG Attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

Anti-Radar, Loitering System, With high Pk (>85) versus blue SAM Radars

Produced by Western Nation, purchased from 3rd Party

Weight 110 KG, (Loaded), Range: 450 NM, Radius 110 NM,

Speed: 250 KN, Height 12,000 ft MSL, GPS/INS guidance

Sensors: TV, Laser, Passive RF seeker,FLIR (possible)

10-12 KG blast warhead

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Seeker Reconnaissance UAV



Reconnaissance, Battle Damage Assessment, Target Designation System

Produced by South Africa, Europe, Israel or China, purchased from manufacturers

Weight 125 KG, (Loaded), Range: 1200 NM, Loiter Time 8-10 hrs

Speed: 250 KN, Cruise speed 150 KN, Height 3000-5000 meters, GPS/INS guidance,preprogrammed or remote pilot

Sensors: EO imaging, Laser, FLIR, MMW, SAR, LTD, LRF jammers and ELINT suites, equipped with communications relay device

Direct Downlink to shooters

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Corner Reflectors

Simple technology – aluminum construction or aluminum foil and cardboard



Truck = TEL

Confuses SAR Radar by returning overly large returns from small reflectors

- **12-20 dB gain in return signal**



Large scattered deployment creates a

Bodyguard False Target Generator System



Red Equipment

Coherent Beam Jammer

Threat Radar/Jammer combination that creates false images for and can spoof space based and airborne to include SAR radars



Red Equipment



Ahriman Laser Blinder

Satellite ISR Denial System: Low to mid power laser capable of temporarily dazzling or blinding optical ISR Satellites in low earth orbit.

Dazzling mode: overloads the focal plane of the imagery satellite without causing permanent damage

Blind mode: Overloads the focal plane with sufficient power to permanently burn out specific pixels in the imager

Satellite tracking/downlink stations integrated with C2 network and Jamming / Blinding Systems

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



Mobile SATCOM Jammer

SATCOM Denial System: Jams satellite uplink brute force noise. Capable of targeting specific frequencies and transponders.

Self-targeting: targets based on rough element set and detected signal downlink activity

Directed Energy Weaponry (DEW)

- **Lasers**
- **High Power Microwave**
- **Radio Frequency Wea**



Degrades US sensors
Shortcircuits Electronics
Technologies are mature in China, Russia/FSU, and Europe
“Tunable Systems” very difficult countermeasure
Proliferation worldwide

TARCS



Limited Quantity – 2 active in Caliphate (w/ poss 2 spares) 5 total on Sumatra
Highly Mobile and automated C2

Tethered Aerostat Radar & C2 System (TARCS)

- **Payloads:** Airborne early warning radars to public emergency broadcasting systems. Simultaneous Multiple payloads on a single TARCS.
- **C2:** 34 active transponders
- **AEW:** Phased array radar mounted in the dimple of the aerostat and can provide full 360° coverage at a range of up to 250nm.

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Mobile C2

Mobile C2 Vehicle (MC2V)

- 4 Red Tactical Command & Control System (RTCCS) workstations
- Receive and send data to HQ and other battle command vehicles, via Fiber junction, HF, RBS, communication satellites, and TARCS.

Limited Quantity - 6-10 Vehicles
Highly Mobile and automated C2

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GPS Jammers
Multi-Function Jammers

- **Can target HF/VHF/UHF CNR's, data nets, cell phones, and GPS**
- **High power output and broadband jamming capability provide flexibility**

MRCM (Monitoring Reconnaissance Counter Measures)
- **Produced by MRCM of Germany and South Africa**
- **20 – 3000 MHz**
- **Barrage Jamming up 240MHz wide**
- **200 W EIRP estimated in GPS band**
- **Scan up to 1000 MHz/s (VHF/UHF)**
- **$2 million a copy**

Unknown Quantity – Possibly 1
High cost and complex operation

GPS Jammers
Ground-Based Portable

- **Multiple jammers required to cover a large area due to low power output.**
- **Lower cost than multifunction jammers**
- **Single purpose**
- **Complex command and control**
- **Manpower intensive**

- **Operating Range - +/- 100 km**
- **Output Power - 4 W**
- **Antenna Gain Factor - 3-5**
- **Transmitter Weight (without power supply) - 8-10 kg**
- **Power Consumption - <25 W**
- **Electrical Requirements - +15V 1.5A; -6V 1.5A**
- **Left knob: Freq Dev (0-6 MHz)**
- **Right knob: FM Mod (44-270 Hz)**

Unknown Quantity – Multiple
Low cost but complex C2

GPS Jammers
Low Cost Home Made

- **A low cost device to temporarily jam C/A code used for the GPS/NAVSTAR L1 Freq.**
- **Not effective against the L2 or new GPS L5 Freq or GLONASS / Galileo systems**
- **Plans and instruction of assembly readily available on-line**
- **Components may be purchased on open market (Radio Shack)**

GPS Jammer



Scenario
Point of Contact

William Lee Simpson, Jr. (Bill) GS-13

Wargaming Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Snail Mail Address

3255 Meyers Ave, Quantico, VA 22134-5069

Actual Location *(not the same as the Snail Mail Address)*

Suite 124, Breckinridge Hall, 2076 South St.., Marine Corps Base, Quantico. Va

simpsonwl@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil

The End

BACK – UP SLIDES

Australian Maritime Forces

- ESG (OPCON to JFMCC)
  - Diesel Sub (Collins class) HMAS Collins

  LHA(X) 12 JSF STOVL RAAF (HMAS Tobruk 2)

  LSD HMAS Minoora 2

  LDP HMAS Kinimbla 2

  HSV’s and Landing Craft (TBD)

  2 FFG’s

  P-3 Orion (+)

  DDG (aegis)

  Logistics STUFT (Ships taken up from trade)

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Australian Land Forces

SASR Sqn (OPCON to JSOTF)

Australian TF (OPCON to JFMCC)
TF (BDE) HQ
Cav Group
- **3 ASLAV Sqn (equiv to LAR Co.)**
- **1 Air Cav Sqn (Blackhawks and Euro Copter Tiger)**

1 Mech Group
- **3 Mech Co M113 A3+**
- **1 Tank Sqn M-1A D**

1 Arty Group
- **3 btry M-198**
- **1 AD btry RBS 90**

1 Eng Group
- **2 Combat Eng Sqn**
- **1 Construction Sqn**

1 Log Group
- **(log and medical support)**

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Australian Support/Issues

- **Darwin, Derby and Perth and Christmas Island are available for staging, basing and logistics.**
- **Australia's involvement in the transition phase/post hostilities stage is a very sensitive regional issue. Their involvement in the post combat / transition phase would probably be limited to humanitarian support.**

Total UK Force Contribution

- Naval
  - CSG
    - 1 x CVF (36 JSF) STVOL
    - 3 x Type 45 (DD)
    - 3 x FSC (FF/DD)
    - 6 x MCMV
    - Maritime Support Ships various
  - ATG
    - 2 x LPH/D (Air Group)
    - 2 x LPD (Bde C4)
    - 4 x LSD(A) (LSD Equiv)
    - 4 x MOD owned RORO's
      - Mil Sea Lift Comd type shipping
- Tailored Air Group
  - 8 x AH64D
  - 14 x CH 47/CH-53X
  - 6 x Med SH (Merlin)
- 3 Cdo Bde (rein)
- Possible Early Entry Force from UK Army
- Details in Speaker

UK BDE ORBAT



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USN 2015 ESF Estimate

Expeditionary Strike Force consists of two CSGs, two ESGs and one MPG.						
The composition of those groups is shown below.						
CSG			ESG		MPG	
1 CVN			1 LHD		3 MPF(F)	each with
	10 F-35C		1 LSD			12 MV-22
	12 F-18E		1 LPD			3 UH-1
	12 F-18F		2 DD(X)			2 MH-60
	20 F-35B		1DDG			2 LC(F)
	4 E-2		1 CG			18 AAAV
	6 H-60		1 SSN			
			4 MH-60R		1 MPF(F)	with
1 CG			4 MH-60S			12 MV-22
	1 H-60					6 AH-1
						2 MH-60
1 DDG	FLIGHT IIA					2 LC(F)
	2 H-60					18 AAAV
					2 MPF(F)	each with
1 DDG						6 MV-22
	1 H-60					10 CH-53
						6 AH-1
1 SSN						1 MH-60
						2 LC(F)
1 T-AOE						17 AAAV
	2 H-60					

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